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Abstract 
This paper examines the moralities of using participants’ personal mobile 
technologies in research. While smartphones bring novel benefits to research in 
terms of their labour-saving, innovative, intuitive and low-cost virtues, they also raise 
unique spatial, ethical and moral issues that can have implications for how research 
is conducted. Using morality as a conceptual tool this paper explores the 
smartphone as a geographical space that is simultaneously private/public, 
personal/shared and material/imagined. By examining the observations made during 
a pilot study which tested a mobile walking tour app, this paper questions the moral 
implications for, and the consequences of, researching using participants’ personal 
technologies and how researchers might access and interpret behaviours within 
these private digital ‘spaces’. This paper advocates the importance of recognising 
the complexities of moving into participants’ private digital spaces and how a diverse 
range of behaviours may become part of the research encounter through the ways in 
which participants form interactions with technologies, the environment and with 
each other. Finally, this paper contributes to discussions of moral geographies by 
examining the asymmetric power relations that are evident when examining moral 
behaviours that are performed simultaneously in digital and geographical spaces, 
and questions whether these may be functions of hegemonic systems of ‘acceptable’ 
behaviour.  
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Introduction 
There has been a recent drive to adopt emergent mobile technologies, such as 
smartphones and tablets, into contemporary geographical research practice 
(DeLyser and Sui, 2013; Gorman, 2017), both in terms of self-directed research (Neff 
and Nafus, 2016) and research[ing] with others (Brown et al., 2013; Laurier et al., 
2016). Yet while advocates argue for the benefits of mobile technologies in 
generating understandings of, among other things, how people relate to technology, 
how technology might affect relationships with places and how researchers might 
capture ‘new’ data in real time, the ethics and moralities of adopting technologies 
into research remains unclear. While technologies add unique spatial dimensions to 
the qualitative methodological canon, this paper will demonstrate how technologies 
bring equally unique spatial, ethical and moral issues to research practice in ways 
that can seem innocuous at first but may have implications for how research is 
conducted, as well as how researchers interact with participants and work within 
digital ‘spaces’ that are not clearly delineated.  
A key driver for these processes has been the adoption of personal mobile 
technologies that save time, resources, expert knowledge and costs. The 
smartphone has undoubtedly led the way here, providing researchers opportunities 
to be innovative in research design (Wellman, 2010). From their abundant everyday 
use, the dizzying array of platforms available through applications, their ‘intuitive’ 
accessibility and relatively reduced cost implications, smartphones have presented 
themselves as almost too tantalising not to deploy as innovative research tools 
(Birenboim and Shoval, 2016). Nevertheless, while mobile technologies may enliven 
contemporary qualitative research, questions can be raised regarding the moral and 
ethical implications and appropriateness of their use. Drawing upon empirical 
research carried out using a newly designed smartphone application, the remainder 
of this paper considers the moral implications of employing participants’ personal 
technologies within research. First, we discuss the recent understandings of moral 
geographies and the smartphone as a geographical space. Next, after outlining the 
project from which this research has been conducted we explore morality as a 
conceptual lens through which to interpret the moral implications of accessing 
participants’ digital ‘spaces’. Finally, by way of concluding we offer insight into how 
researchers might consider more carefully the adoption of mobile technologies as 
research tools.      
Moral geographies 
To frame this discussion, we draw upon the ‘moral turn’ in Geography and how, 
since the latter part of the 1990s this has influenced consideration of ethics, care and 
responsibility. During this time attitudes towards social justice, radical politics, 
equitable policy directives and ethical academic practices were changing, being 
infused with what has become widely recognised as ‘moral geographies’ – the 
connections between places and behaviours and the appropriateness of expressing 
behaviours in and across space[s]. Moral geographies provide an excellent lens 
through which to examine these relationships between smartphones and research, 
particularly in terms of the people-place-technology connections afforded by their 
use. Matless (1994:127), for example examines the ways in which morality is 
conducted and received by people, in particular the “different ways of being in the 
world and the reactions of others to them”. This blending of moral philosophical 
thought alongside geographical perspectives, while contentious, provides 
opportunities to ‘think geographically’ about the “spatial variations in everyday 
moralities [that] will inevitably be closely entangled with spatial variations in the 
‘structure’ and ‘functioning’ of human groupings” (Philo, 1991, cited in Smith, 
1997:587). Pertinent to this study of using participants’ smartphones in research is 
the notion that morality functions at various spatial scales. For example, Goffman 
(1963) examines the moralities involved in everyday interactions and social order, 
while Durkheim (1974) focuses on the ways in which morality can be internalised 
and embodied. This highlights the multidimensionality of morality whilst 
simultaneously emphasising individuals as being essentially “answerable only to 
oneself” (Foucault, 1988a:65).  
Useful to extending this debate is McAuliffe’s (2012) suggestion that moral 
geographies are concerned with how environments may be used and misused and 
how this encourages debates that question the appropriateness of particular/different 
behaviour[s] as well as the power dynamics that operate within spaces. Matless 
(1994), among others, employs Foucault’s (1986) ‘three senses of morality’ to help 
disentangle people’s ethical relationships to certain behaviours. This entails first 
outlining a moral code (essentially a set of rules) and interpreting the ways in which 
behaviours attached to the code may be considered obedient or transgressive, 
before reflecting upon how individuals relate to elements of the code as ‘ethical 
subjects’. Foucault (1986:25) defines morality as “relat[ing] to the real behaviour of 
individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them”, 
suggesting people’s understandings of ‘what is moral behaviour?’ can be complex, 
diffuse and contested. Foucault’s reasoning is useful to this investigation by raising 
questions about why research participants may appear to simultaneously acquiesce 
and/or resist elements of a research encounter, particularly when research is being 
conducted with[in] the ostensibly private sphere of a personal smartphone. This 
paper extends moral geographical work through attending to these asymmetric 
power relations that are evident when examining moral behaviours that are 
performed simultaneously in digital and geographical spaces, and questions whether 
these may be functions of hegemonic systems of ‘acceptable’ behaviour.  
Smartphone technologies 
This section examines the geographies of smartphones and how their usage creates 
unique opportunities and challenges for research. Smartphones have largely 
permeated contemporary lifestyles and are fundamental in shaping some of the 
activities many people undertake and the ways through which these activities are 
operationalised. Indeed, Lupton’s (2013) discussion of the ‘digital cyborg’, a 
contemporary reworking of Haraway’s cyborg concepts, highlights how technology 
has changed understandings of (and relationships with) bodies, and in a 
geographical sense, through the ways in which technology may extend the body, 
affecting bodily rhythms and interactions through space and time. Crucially, there is 
value in recognising how such ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1988b) are 
important devices for the creation and [re]definition of individual identities. Foucault’s 
terminology is quite simply concerned with the methods through which individuals 
employ technologies that [re]create and [re]define the Self (Burkitt, 2002). Indeed, 
Kinsley (2014:371) describes the human/technological interface using the contexts of 
‘technics’ as “the problematic and constitutive relation between what we call ‘human’ 
and ‘technology’” and relatedly “‘technicity’ as the (emergent) qualities of that relation 
as it is performed”. This demonstrates the symbiotic, or hybridised nature of 
smartphone usage – blurring the more typical boundaries between geographical and 
virtual space (de Souza e Silva, 2006). This was most recently witnessed in the 
summer of 2016 during the craze for the smartphone application ‘Pokémon GO’, a 
location-based game in which players explore the terrain of their local area in search 
of creatures contained within the application. This hybridisation of physical and 
digital space[s] using augmented reality demonstrates opportunities to explore new 
digital topographies and presents exciting ways for researchers to consider how 
humans might interact emotionally and affectively within their ‘real’ and ‘imagined’ 
surroundings.  
Central to the success of smartphone technology has been the development of 
mobile applications (hereafter referred to as apps). Indeed, Wellman (2010:181) 
affectionately describes smartphones as “the Swiss Army knives of connectivity – 
with cameras, GPS, compasses, and tens of thousands of other ‘apps’ […] providing 
myriad affordances”. Moreover, Christensen and Prax (2012) consider apps to be 
crucial to the networked relationships between people, mobilities, cultures, 
technologies and the internet. This essentially reconfigures assemblages of, and 
relationships between, people and practice (Goggin, 2009) by encouraging users to 
engage with spaces in novel and stimulating ways through the devices they hold in 
their hands. This opens up greater potential to examine new ways of understanding 
portability and connectivity in research, as well as how users might converge with 
one another or work through tasks in more novel ways (Laurier et al., 2016). Yet, as 
Goggin (2011) cautions, while smartphone technologies and apps may be heralded 
as a new cultural platform through which we might activate and disseminate 
knowledge, they are also relatively unsecured, unmediated, and untested as 
research devices. They carry risks of theft, damage and corruption (Welsh and 
France, 2012), as well as fears of disruption and other associated risks through 
accessing inappropriate content, misconduct and cyber-bullying, making them 
ethically and morally complex and problematic instruments to engage with in 
research. Hence, this paper postulates the risks involved in incorporating such 
shadowy technology uncritically into research design and how researchers may 
consider mitigating them. 
Researching with personal devices 
The research for this paper comes from a project conducted in 2016/17 in which we1 
designed ‘PlymTour’ – a self-guided walking tour of Plymouth (UK), housed within a 
free and institutionally managed ‘Mobile with Plymouth University’ app that is 
available to Plymouth University students. This tour was designed to encourage 
students to access content about specific locations around the city (e.g. descriptions 
of locations, photographs, weblinks, quizzes etc.) directly from their smartphones 
whilst exploring Plymouth’s city centre. In all, ten locations were included that 
comprised important touristic, historical, social and commercial spaces.  
                                                          
1 This research team comprised two geographers who designed the content and a learning technologist from 
Plymouth University who coordinated the design of the app itself.  
Once the app had been developed, ethical approval was granted to conduct a pilot 
study with students recruited from the Geography department to examine how 
participants engaged with the app’s interface, the locations (and routes between 
them) and content. We chose participant observation over other virtual/video 
ethnographies (see: Laurier et al., 2016; Duggan, 2017) as we were unable to 
secure permission to film in some of the private locations along the tour. Yet, by 
observing how our participants engaged with the technology, each other and the 
environment we ensured that our research remained ‘in place’ for the duration of the 
tours. To recruit willing participants we invited student groups undertaking a first year 
module that contained a field-based assessment that closely aligned with the content 
and locations we had developed to take part in the research. Information sheets 
were distributed to students during the first practical session for the module and 
groups were given the opportunity to contact us should they wish to take part. In all, 
four groups were involved, comprising seventeen students in total. These were self-
selected, meaning group participants all knew each other, and there were mixed 
levels of knowledge of the technology and the locations. Prior to the research, 
participants were prompted to install or update their app and to ensure they had a full 
battery on their smartphones. Groups were asked to meet at one of the researchers’ 
offices for a briefing on how to operate the app; to go through the structure and 
intentions of the research and complete consent forms; and for any questions the 
participants might have. Aside from health and safety guidance we were keen at this 
stage to not set out any rules or regulations. We wanted to facilitate a more ‘natural’ 
research environment that was about how the participants were interacting with the 
app, and not about how we might want them to use it or behave whilst using it. Each 
encounter took approximately 2.5-3 hours to complete and we accompanied each 
group as they walked around the city, observing their use of the app, their 
interactions with one another and with the environment. Our observations were voice 
recorded and then later transcribed for analysis using Nvivo.  
 [Re]appropriating technologies as ‘research’ spaces  
We begin by considering the spatial implications of incorporating personal devices in 
research. This came from warnings in the literature against re-appropriating social 
media, such as Facebook or Twitter, into spaces of research. Jarvis and Dickie 
(2010:177) argue that young people may consider their personal devices to be 
“invaded by academic materials” when asked to use them in learning or research 
situations. Pressures existed for us in interpreting how the students were engaging 
with the app, particularly as the participants’ ownership of the technology, both 
materially and symbolically, meant we were not inclined to direct how they interacted 
with it. We wanted the participants to engage with it in the most ‘natural’ way 
possible without interference from us and in doing so we felt uncomfortable 
intervening if they appeared to disengage. This lead to a slight tension between a 
desire to better understand the students’ use of the app and a hesitancy to question 
or intrude, as expressed in the researchers’ observation below  
“I think the phone use is note taking rather than app watching. That's one 
thing that's actually quite difficult with this approach without being able to 
intervene and ask. You don't want to peer over people's shoulders, it feels too 
rude!” (Group, C) 
“So, one of them has got her phone in her hand, and I can see she’s got the 
app open, but she’s not looking at it. She’s just, sort of, waving it around, and 
every so often glances at it.” (Group A) 
This aligns with Thomas et al’s. (2014) critique of employing personal technologies in 
learning situations. As these quotes imply, it is almost impossible to know fully how 
they are used in terms of what is viewed or what is shared, and our method of 
participant observation meant that we sometimes had to be very proximate to our 
participants to see what was going on. Yet what was interesting here was how our 
‘innovative’ app was housed within the digital space of a smartphone that was very 
familiar to the participants. Hence the ubiquity of smartphone technology appeared 
to normalise their experience of the app, reducing its novelty and impact as both an 
educational and research tool.  
Moreover, this complicates the moral roles of researcher and subject, and 
problematises our perceived identities as passive observers of these encounters. 
Instead we were positioned as active observers of a tool we had created and that 
was influencing our participants’ engagements with their personal technologies (the 
presence of the app on their smartphones, our knowledge of the content of the app 
and the different ways that the participants might interact with it). Indeed, this forms 
what De Saulles and Horner (2011) have described as the ‘portable panopticon’, a 
digital version of Foucault’s (1995) notions of surveillance whereby the smartphone 
becomes a space through which actions can be monitored and assessed. Here the 
smartphone becomes an apparatus of control through which behaviours are 
mediated virtually and anonymously. In the context of our research, we were, in 
many ways, privileged in knowing in advance how the app might shape the ways in 
which the participants moved through both the physical landscape of the city as well 
as the digital terrain of their private smartphone. Additionally, our status as observers 
meant we viewed the participants’ use of the app from a distance, essentially 
reducing them to being “the object of information, [but not the] subject in 
communication" (Foucault, 1995:200). Yet while this positionality was unintentionally 
performed, it is crucial to recognise that these power dynamics have consequences 
when using participants’ personal devices in research. In developing this we 
acknowledge McAuliffe’s (2012:203) suggestion to recognise a “politics of place” 
when appropriating space, particularly in terms of how we might interpret different 
behaviours that are expressed using digital devices. We therefore identify the value 
in balancing engagement with research with being sensitive to the ownership of 
other private spaces within personal technologies that help produce behaviours that 
fit within how participants (and researchers) perceive acceptable behaviours and 
assumed moral rules.  
The merging of habits and identities in smartphone spaces 
To further understand these implications for researching with participants’ digital 
technologies we draw upon Foucault’s (1986) interpretation of morality and practices 
of the Self to gauge how and why the participants might have interacted differently 
with their smartphones once they had been asked to use them in the research. 
Foucault highlights the ambiguity of morality as a word, specifically in terms of the 
hierarchical and potentially hegemonic sets of values and rules that may constitute 
‘moral behaviours’. Here we concern ourselves with morality in terms of principles or 
rules of ‘correct’ conduct – put simply, the distinction between right and wrong – that 
may be assumed or implied by individuals. Foucault problematises this though by 
suggesting that individuals’ moral behaviours (or codes) are complexly interrelated – 
being constantly corrected, counterbalanced and cancelled out depending upon how 
individuals engage with certain situations in space and time. During our research 
encounters, interpreting these behaviours became complicated as there were 
inconsistencies in how participants engaged with devices and spaces both across 
the groups and for the duration of the tours:  
“I think one person has got their phone out but I think they're probably taking 
notes or on Facebook, rather than actually using it to look at the app.” (Group 
D) 
“One person has got their phone out but it looks like they’re looking at other 
things on the phone rather than actually using it to look at the app.” (Group B)  
These comments indicate how the ways in which the participants conducted 
themselves in relation to what Foucault (1986) refers to as the prescriptive elements 
of a moral code was important. We refrained from asking participants not to use their 
smartphones for social media during the research yet, as the quotes imply, this 
raised a dilemma over what might be deemed the ‘appropriate usage’ of a personal 
device as a research instrument (e.g. as this is a research encounter should the 
PlymTour app take priority over social media for the duration of the research?). 
Mediating this is, of course, an impossible (and impractical) task, particularly as the 
participants were utilising a device they had significant identity connections with, 
meaning expecting them not to continue expressing their habits whilst using their 
smartphones could be considered unreasonable.  
This raises questions of what might be considered the ethics of changing behaviours 
in different socio-spatial and public/private spaces (Smith, 1997). This is pertinent as 
moral behaviours can be viewed as processual, in that they are incorporated into 
everyday practices (Giddens, 1991). Bourdieu’s (1990) theories of habitus and 
capital are useful here in revealing links between disposition and practice and the 
disturbance of routines. While Bourdieu does not attend explicitly to notions of ethics 
and morality in his research, his understandings of Self and Other certainly provide a 
foundation from which to examine moral judgements. Drawing on Bourdieu’s ideas of 
the field, Lamont (1992), for example, examines the ‘moral boundaries’ that may be 
erected to delineate acceptable behaviours in certain social fields. This identifies 
complexities regarding the roles of power, mobility and structure in determining how 
and why ‘moral signals’ are produced as well as the vital resource they provide in 
establishing different social positions. Ignatow (2009) extends this by suggesting that 
moral behaviours (in this case, the use of a personal device as part of a research 
encounter) are a product of embodied and cognitive practices that are then practiced 
(and perhaps mediated) in the realm of negotiated social discourses (here, by both 
researcher and participant). Hence, we recognise that research using personal 
technologies does not exist in a spatial, or temporal vacuum, meaning participants 
cannot (and should not) divorce themselves from their digital worlds when 
participating in research. Indeed, while Laurier et al. (2016) argue that smartphones 
have reconfigured our understandings of place and mobility through mediation 
between habit and reflexivity, our research suggests that this demonstrates the 
pliability, permeability and flexibility of digital moral boundaries, particularly in terms 
of how these are then overlaid onto geographical spaces.  
Resistance, disengagement and disruption 
The final theme is concerned with the subtle forms of resistance, disengagement and 
disruption that were evident in our research. McAuliffe (2012:191) draws upon 
Cresswell’s work on transgressive people, behaviours and practices that are deemed 
‘out of place’ in mainstream society, arguing that: 
“Moral geographies reflect the normative expectations of the use and misuse 
of particular environments, and as such can form the basis of inclusion and 
exclusion as the transgression of normal ways of being in a place are policed 
in order to ensure the maintenance of the common good.” 
Yet, defining ‘normal ways of being’ can be a thorny topic, particularly as ‘our’ 
moralities as researchers inevitably differed from those of our participants. For 
example, Goffman (1963:8) explores the influence of different behaviours upon 
social systems by considering ‘social order’ to be formed through “the consequence 
of any set of moral norms that regulates the way in which persons pursue 
objectives”. Indeed, Giddens (1991) suggests that to normalise moral orderings is to 
consider behaviour to be bound in traditional practices that resist ‘new’ practices, 
meaning deviations from tradition (or what may be perceived to be traditional) may 
cause consternation. This was evident in our study and, as the following excerpts 
attest, while these examples were not instances of bad behaviour, they illustrate a 
subversion of what might be assumed codes of behaviour in research practice: 
“Okay, [some students are] taking selfies [around stop one]. I think that's 
probably quite interesting in terms of safety and comfort, for the students to 
have their phones out and feel comfortable with doing that sort of thing.” 
(Group D) 
“We’re on Union Street and some of the boys are larking around rattling doors 
on the derelict Palace Theatre and trying to take photos through the smashed 
windows. Two guys have just walked past us and were taking the mickey [but] 
I don't think anyone noticed that actually. I don't think the students noticed.” 
(Group C) 
What is important to recognise here then is that moral codes are relational, in terms 
of “what actually is right or wrong differs among individuals, societies and cultures” 
(Smith, 1997:586). Yet, as the activities in the quotes suggest, this relationality 
makes moral behaviour difficult to distinguish. Durkheim (1974) argues that from an 
individualistic perspective, morality is measured internally, rather than externally, 
rendering appraising moralities (e.g. intentions, conduct and accountabilities) an act 
of the Self and not of the Other. Hence, individuals submit voluntarily to that moral 
code rather than by force. This resonates with our encounters (e.g. the taking of 
selfies and the hijinks that reflected the participants’ relative aged identities and 
practices), particularly as the moral codes at play during our research appeared 
opaque and existed in a state of flux, meaning they were difficult to discern, let alone 
define.  
In reconciling this, by utilising personal smartphones for research purposes we were 
bound to invite playful transgressions alongside opportunities for self-reflexivity and 
enlightenment, yet by avoiding mediation – and avoiding overlaying our own moral 
codes – we encouraged the participants to draw (and re-draw) their own moral 
boundaries in ways that supported both our research needs and the participants’ 
routinized behaviours. Hence, we were mindful of the implications for what could be 
assumed to be ‘appropriate behaviours’ during the research encounters (and if these 
could be assumed to be [in]appropriate at all!). To support this, Butler (2005) advises 
being reflexive and critical of the changing social contexts through which 
interpretations of morality emerge, meaning while moralities are produced and 
negotiated through socio-historical contexts these are not fixed and can be adapted 
or reconciled depending on their situation. For example, we were aware of the 
potential impact that our predefined positions of lecturer/student may have brought to 
these encounters (e.g. the assumption that smartphone use is disruptive in learning 
situations, or that ‘teachers’ might discipline inappropriate uses of technology 
(Thomas et al., 2014)) and the hierarchies and power imbalances that these may 
constitute. We were therefore keen to avoid turning these encounters into ‘mobile 
classrooms’ with codified rules about how/when to use smartphones. Beyond 
providing information on health and safety and briefing the students on privacy and 
data protection we were conscious to play down any sort of code of conduct or 
lecturing on ‘appropriate’ interactions with us as researchers.  
Notwithstanding, despite our attempts to minimise guidelines of ‘correct’ behaviours, 
we were still complicit in the production of our participants as, what Foucault (1986) 
terms ‘ethical subjects’. In doing so we were keen to provide the participants greater 
agency in developing their own senses of what ethical behaviours might look like 
with/in technological spheres to encourage them to more readily consider their own 
moral responsibilities (e.g. allowing leadership and teamwork to emerge and be 
managed or letting participants decide how and when they might engage with the 
app). So, by not privileging our research we allowed for playfulness and agency to 
permeate the encounters, encouraging sensitivity to the “different ways of being in 
the world and the reactions of others to them” (Matless, 1994:127). As such, rather 
than penalising infractions of assumed rules and conduct, the diverse range of 
behaviours became part of the research through the ways in which the participants 
formed their interactions with the technology, the environment and with each other. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper began by outlining the ways in which mobile technologies 
have transformed understandings of, and relationships with, bodies and 
digital/geographical spaces and how this might add value to self-directed research or 
research with others. Yet, while it is agreed that this may generate new ways of 
understanding mobility, connectivity and the convergence of subjects in research, we 
have been critical of mobile digital technologies being considered an unproblematic 
addition to the qualitative social research toolkit. By drawing upon notions of morality 
we sought to tease out the entangled moral, ethical and spatial implications 
connected to utilising participants’ personal devices as instruments of research, and 
from this we can offer three key recommendations that recognise the complexities of 
researching with[in] participants’ smartphones. 
We first acknowledge the risks involved in trespassing into participants’ digital 
spaces, stressing the importance of not underestimating the position of the 
researcher and subject during research encounters. While institutions may grant 
ethical approval, and participants may provide informed consent to conduct research 
using personal technologies, these spaces are voluminous and complexly 
interconnected with one another. Notwithstanding, in extending Jarvis and Dickie 
(2010) this should not necessarily mean that such spaces are off-limits. By 
examining the politics of place (McAuliffe, 2012) present in research encounters we 
advocate recognising participants’ material and symbolic ownership of their 
technologies as influenced by the moral boundaries that they may erect and/or 
dismantle and how this contributes towards shaping, and reshaping, the social 
positioning of researchers and subjects during research encounters.  
Expanding on this, we support claims that personal technologies can be tools that 
represent participants’ habitual identities and are thus influenced by their individual, 
and complexly interrelated, moral codes. By drawing upon Foucault’s (1986) 
interpretation of the Self as a non-prescriptive and constantly evolving entity that 
continually [re]negotiates the relationship between Self and Other, we argue against 
privileging research over access to non-academic digital spaces. The boundaries 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ digital behaviour are decidedly opaque and should be 
approached with caution. Expecting participants not to slip into digital habits 
(checking social media, taking photographs, accessing different apps/content etc.) is 
unreasonable as this is simply behaviour that falls within the remit of their ‘normal’ 
moral identities, as opposed to a research encounter, which is decidedly 
extraordinary.  
Our third recommendation draws upon the subtle subversive and disruptive 
behaviours that were witnessed during our research encounters. By examining this 
through the lens of morality we considered these subversions not as infractions on 
morality, but as a method of articulating alternative interpretations of morality that 
expressed agency, playfulness and reactivity. Here, we argue that researchers could 
reconsider normative representations of research fields as spaces to acquiesce by 
contemplating the value of participants ‘misusing’ research spaces (both ‘real’ and 
‘virtual’) in order to assist in smoothing power irregularities between researchers and 
participants that may potentially [re]invigorate the research encounter in ways that 
have not necessarily been considered.  
Finally, in drawing these themes together, we contribute towards discussions of 
moral geographies by identifying how the irregular power dimensions involved in 
moral behaviours may be functions of hegemonic systems of ‘acceptable’ behaviour 
– particularly in terms of how moralities are expressed and understood. To borrow 
from Laurier et al. (2016), our research examines how group intersubjectivities may 
[re]produce certain behaviours during research encounters that shape, and are 
shaped by, different person-place-technology assemblages. 
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